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ABTRACT
The main objective of this study is to examine the influence of Monopoly 
Power and Integrity on fraud that occurs in the e-procurement process. 
This study involved parties directly related to the procurement of goods 
and services and the development of electronic procurement systems 
incorporated in the Procurement Service Unit (referred to in Indonesia 
as Unit Layanan Pengadaan / ULP) and the Electronic Procurement 
Services (or referred to Layanan Pengadaan Secara Elektronik / 
LPSE). This study used a quantitative approach and primary data in 
the form of questionnaire as measurement instrument. The method of 
analysis was done using SmartPLS 3. Path analysis and bootstrapping 
technique were used to test the hypothesis. The results of this study 
show that power monopoly has a significant positive effect on fraud 
in e-procurement, while integrity has a significant negative effect on 
fraud in e-procurement.
Keyword: Monopoly power, Integrity, Fraud, E-procurement
Asia Pacific Fraud Journal
E-ISSN: 2502-695X, ISSN: 2502-8731
Volume 4, Nomor 1 (January-June) 2019
http://apfjournal.or.id/index.php/apf 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE)
Indonesia Chapter
© 2019
1. INTRODUCTION
Procurement of goods and services is 
a major factor in driving the wheels 
of development. Almost all public 
sector activities involve the process of 
procuring goods and services, such as 
in the form of biding / tender, direct 
procurement, and direct appointment or 
self-management. Vaidya et al. (2009: 474) 
states that the government aspires to use 
public procurement as an economic lever, 
technology reform, and social reform. Public 
procurement has an important function 
in the government. The large amount of 
budget expenditure for procurement has 
a big impact on the economy, therefore it 
needs to be managed properly (Thai, 2001). 
Procurement of goods includes equipment 
and buildings for both public and private 
interests (Bahagia, 2011).
Procurement of goods and services in 
Indonesia has been regulated in Presidential 
Regulation Number 54 of 2010 with several 
changes. The regulation requires that the 
procurement of goods and services in the 
public sector be carried out electronically, 
or commonly referred to e-procurement. 
E-procurement was only implemented in 
all local governments in 2013 because it 
was hampered by a number of technical 
conditions. E-procurement is expected to 
be able to suppress the occurrence of fraud 
in the process of procuring goods and 
services, which often occurs in the public 
sector. Data shows that there were 171 cases 
of corruption in the field of procurement 
of goods and services as of December 
31, 2017 (KPK, 2017). This condition put 
corruption in the procurement of goods 
and services in second place after bribery. 
This proves that until 2017 there was still 
a lot of fraud in the procurement of goods 
and services even though e-procurement 
system had been implemented. Corruption 
in procurement tends to be a more serious 
problem in developing countries than in 
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developed countries (Raymond, 2008).
In practice, the implementation 
of e-procurement has not been able 
to suppress the cause of fraud in the 
procurement of goods and services as a 
whole starting from planning to the final 
results of work. One difficult condition 
to control in e-procurement is that some 
public officials use monopoly power for 
personal benefits, such as accepting bribes 
in exchange for giving tenders or giving 
contracts to partners they like (OECD, 
2010). In certain situations, government 
officials use their monopoly power over 
the supply of goods and services, thus 
leading to corruption without theft 
(Neupane, 2014). Corruption in public 
procurement mostly comes from the public 
administration where the officers who are 
in charge of managing procedures use 
their monopoly power to manipulate the 
process for their own destination (Fazekas, 
2015).
Fraud in e-procurement can also be 
caused by lack of integrity. Integrity plays 
an important role in the procurement 
of goods and services and affects the 
process of procurement of goods and 
services holistically. Lack of integrity in 
procurement organizations may result in the 
lack of objectivity in technical evaluations 
and qualifications, especially during the 
evaluation of bid proposals, prices, etc. 
(Huda et al., 2017). In e-procurement, 
integrity refers to maintaining the accuracy 
and completeness of information and 
processing methods including preventing 
unauthorized system modifications and 
information (Zack, 2015). The importance 
of integrity in the procurement process, 
especially in the public sector, requires 
attaching an integrity pact that has been 
regulated by law. The purpose of this 
study is to analyze the fraud that occurs in 
e-procurement by analyzing the influence 
of monopoly power and integrity on 
e-procurement fraud.
2. THEORETICAL BASIS 
Fraud Diamond Theory
Fraud diamond theory by Wolfe and 
Hermanson (2004) is a development of 
the fraud triangle theory by Cressey. 
Fraud triangle theory consists of only 
three elements: opportunity, pressure 
and rationalization while fraud diamond 
theory consists of four elements: 
opportunity, pressure, rationalization, 
and capability. According to Wolfe and 
Hermanson (2004), the components that 
affect individual capability to commit 
fraud are position / function, brains, 
confidence / ego, coercion skills, effective 
lying, and immunity to stress.
The four elements in fraud diamond 
theory explain that incentive is a strong 
desire based on the needs of a person so 
that he intends to commit fraud. In this 
case, Wolfe and Hermanson interpret it 
as a pressure. Opportunity is a condition 
that arises because of the weakness in the 
system that can be used by people who 
understand the system so they can commit 
fraud. Rationalization is a description of the 
attitudes and thoughts of fraudsters that if 
someone commits fraud, the results and 
risks obtained will be commensurate with 
the fraud he has committed. Capability is 
a condition related to the ability possessed 
and needed by someone so that he is the 
right person to commit fraud. With his 
capability he can recognize the existence of 
opportunity to commit fraud and can turn 
it into reality.
Monopoly Power 
Klitgaard (1988), in his theory, formulates: 
C = M + D – A (Corruption equals to Monopoly 
plus Discretion minus Accountability). 
In the context of procurement of goods 
and services, Klitgaard (1988) shows that 
monopoly power is a corrupt behavior 
that tends to arise when an organization or 
public official has authority over goods or 
services that generates money and has the 
power to decide who will receive it and is 
not responsible for his actions. Neupane 
(2014) describes monopoly power as 
a power owned by a procurement 
practitioner, in this case government 
employee, and one of the important keys in 
the procurement of goods and services in 
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the public sector. According to Voskanyan 
(2000), when officials have monopoly 
power over the provision of government 
goods, this makes it possible to explain the 
emergence of corruption incidents without 
theft. Monopoly power arises because of 
legal reasons that certain officials are the 
only ones appointed to do certain tasks.
Integrity
Lack of integrity is an important factor in 
the occurrence of fraud in the procurement 
of goods and services. According to OECD 
(2016), integrity refers to the enforcement 
of ethical standards and moral values  of 
honesty, professionalism and truth that 
becomes the basis for ensuring fairness, 
non-discrimination and compliance in the 
public procurement process. Schlenker 
(2008) defines that integrity involves 
honesty, trust, and loyalty in maintaining 
one’s mandate and obligations, and 
inability or unwillingness to violate prin-
ciples without regard to temptations, 
costs, and preferences of others. Integrity 
is a quality that underlies public trust and 
is a benchmark for members to test all 
their decisions (Sukriah et al., 2009). The 
importance of integrity in the procurement 
process, especially in the public sector, 
requires attaching an integrity pact that has 
been regulated by law. The Integrity Pact is 
a statement containing a pledge to prevent 
and not commit collusion, corruption and 
nepotism in the Procurement of Goods and 
Services (Presidential Decree No. 70, 2012).
E-Procurement Fraud
According to Davila et al. (2003), public 
e-procurement is defined as the use 
of internet or web-based information 
and communication technology by the 
government in conducting procurement 
relations with bidders for the acquisition of 
goods, jobs, services and other consulting 
services needed by the public sector. 
E-procurement is the integration and 
electronic management of all procurement 
activities including purchase requests, 
authorization, ordering, shipping and 
payment between buyers and suppliers 
(Chaffey, 2009).
Fraud may occur in e-procurement 
because the e-procurement system has 
not been able to cover holistically and has 
not been able to prevent fraud related to 
monopoly power and lack of integrity 
of the officers involved in it. Fraud 
usually arises during registration. In this 
case, officials often request unnecessary 
conditions or information during the 
registration process. Unfortunately, the 
conditions or information are only owned 
by the preferred vendors, while other 
vendors (smaller but qualified) may not 
have them (Zack, 2015). According to 
Huda et al. (2017) e-procurement fraud can 
occur at the evaluation stage because there 
is a subjective element in the valuation of 
offers including a bandwidth limit game so 
that only certain participants can register. 
The lack of technological capabilities of 
officers/service providers and the level 
of capabilities of the human resources 
are inhibiting factors in e-procurement 
(Nurisra, 2011). For this reason, there needs 
to be good integration and collaboration 
among procurement policies, stakeholders 
involved, and the role of the Procurement 
Service Unit (ULP) to achieve optimization 
in implementing public procurement of 
goods and services through e-Procurement 
(Nurlukman, 2017).
The Effect of Monopoli Power on 
E-Procurement Fraud
The e-procurement process involves many 
parties and must go through several stages. 
These conditions, added with the existence 
of different interests, tend to cause fraud 
due to the monopoly power. According to 
Klitgaard et al. (2002), if someone controls 
a monopoly over goods and services and 
has unlimited authority to decide who 
has the right to get the goods and services 
and without accountability, there might 
be corruption there. This applies to the 
government sector.
According to the OECD (2010), one 
of the causes of fraud in procurement 
of goods and services in Indonesia is the 
existence of monopoly power. In the case 
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of rigging tenders, supernormal profits can 
be expected by bidding participants and 
tender committees that guarantee certain 
tender participants to obtain contracts. In 
some situations, government officials have 
a monopoly power on the provision of 
goods and services that are very important 
for corruption without theft (Neupane, 
2014).
Supported by capabilities and 
knowledge in the field of procurement of 
goods and services, government officials 
who are involved in procurement can 
commit fraud in the e-procurement 
process. For example, a Commitment 
Making Officer (PPK) is able to mark 
price up with existing knowledge and 
authority on him while other procurement 
implementers cannot do this. This is in 
accordance with the theory of Fraud 
Diamond, one of which is Capability, 
where in the presence of this element 
government officials can monopolize 
power. Based on the description above, the 
hypothesis proposed in the study is:
H1:Monopoli Power has an effect on 
e-Procurement fraud.
The Effect of Integrity on E-Procurement
Integrity plays an important role in 
the success of e-procurement. Integrity 
is needed starting from planning to 
completion of work. Lack of integrity 
can cause fraud to occur at the beginning 
of e-procurement. If fraud occurs at the 
beginning, there will be a dilemma at the 
next stage of e-procurement. According to 
McCue et al. (2015), there are at least five 
dilemmas that affect the implementation 
of procurement: flexibility, accountability, 
bureaucracy, efficiency and procurement 
training.
Amrizal (2004) explains that fraud often 
occurs in an entity when the individual 
employed does not think about honesty 
and integrity. In e-procurement, integrity 
is a crucial matter which is prone to 
neglect. Integrity is an option for someone 
to do a good job or otherwise commit fraud 
deliberately for his personal interests.
Integrity violations in the procurement 
of goods / services are related to the 
opportunity, rationalization and capability, 
which are elements of the diamond fraud 
theory. With opportunity, rationalization, 
and capability, the procurement officers 
are usually tempted and easy to commit 
fraud. Based on the description above, the 
hypothesis proposed in the study is:
H2:Integrity has an effect on e-procurement 
fraud
3. METHOD
This study employed a quantitative 
approach with primary data in the form 
of questionnaires. The questionnaires 
were distributed to 95 respondents 
related to the process of e-procurement 
of goods and services in four Regencies of 
Regional Government. The respondents 
involved in this study were Commitment 
Making Officers (PPK), Auction / Tender 
Committee, Procurement Officers, and 
E-Procurement Service (LPSE) Officers. 
The respondents spread in the Procurement 
Service Units (ULP), E-Procurement 
Services (LPSE), and several Regional 
Apparatus Organizational Units (SOPD) 
that had a large budget in the procurement 
of goods and services.
Data Analysis Technique and Hypothesis 
Test
The data used in this study are analyzed 
using SmartPLS 3 which is believed to 
be able to test the predictive relationship 
between constructs. Therefore, PLS-SEM 
is very suitable for use in research aimed 
at developing theory. The stages in the 
SmartPLS 3 analysis are through the outer 
and inner models by looking at composite 
reliability value. The data with composite 
reliability value > 0.7 have high reliability. 
The Average Variance Extracted (AVE) 
value expected is > 0.5. Reliability test is 
reinforced with. The value of Cronbach 
Alpha expected is > 0.7 for all constructs. 
The loading factor value between 0.6 - 0.7 
for exploratory studies is still acceptable. In 
this study, researchers take a factor loading 
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value above 0.6, while the values  below 0.6 
would be discarded. The R-Square values 
of 0.67, 0.33 and 0.19 show that the model 
is strong, moderate and weak, while the 
values of 0.75, 0.5 and 0.25 show the model 
is strong, moderate and weak (Chin, 1998; 
Hair et.al., 2011 in Ghozali and Latan, 
2015).
Hypothesis test is conducted by 
calculating the value of the relationship 
between variables using bootstrapping. 
This test is conducted to see the 
significance value of t-statistics > 1.96. 
The significance value of 5 % is obtained 
by comparing the p-value at alpha (0.05). 
The hypothesis can be accepted if there is a 
relationship between exogenous variable 
and endogenous variable, or if t-statistics 
> t-table (1.96 sig 5%) and P-value < alpha 
(0.05). The hypothesis equation is as 
follows:
Y’ = α + b1Χ1 + b2Χ2+ ε
Were:
Y’= Dependent variable (WI)
α= Constant coefficients
b= Regression coefficient
Χ= Independent Variable (PC and PW)
ε= Variable interference (Error)
4. RESEARCH RESULT AND 
DISCUSSION
Partial Least Square (PLS) Analysis
Based on the measurement of the outer 
model, the results are obtained according 
to the following table 1.
Table 1
Reliability Test Results of the Constructs
Variable
Compos-
ite Reli-
ability
Cron-
bachs 
Alpha
Monopoly Power 0.949 0.939
Integrity 0.946 0.935
e-Procurement Fraud 0.936 0.922
Source: Data Process
Figure 1 
Coefficient Path
Source: Data Process
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Based on the test results in table 1, it 
can be seen that the Cronbachs Alpha 
value is greater than 0.6 and the composite 
reliability value is greater than 0.7. Thus, 
based on calculations and the provisions 
of the composite reliability values, 
all indicators are declared reliable in 
measuring latent variables.
Table 2
Validity Test Results of the Constructs
Variable AVE
Monopoli Power 0.702
Integrity 0.688
e-Procurement Fraud 0.648
Source: Data Process
Based on Table 4.2, it can be seen that 
all variables produce the Average Variance 
Extracted (AVE) values greater than 0.5. 
Thus the indicator is declared valid to 
measure the variable.
Table 3
Determination Coefficient Value
Model R2
Y = ρ1 X1 + ρ2 X2 + e 0.509
Q2  = 1 –(1- R2Y)
Q2  = 1 –(1- 0.509)=0.509
Source: Data Process
The R-square value of e-procurement 
model is 0.509 or 50.9%. This indicates 
that the diversity of e-procurement fraud 
can be explained by the Monopoly Power 
and Integrity, or 50.9%. In other words, 
the contribution of monopoly power and 
integrity to the e-procurement fraud is 
50.9%, while the remaining 49.1% is the 
contribution of other variables not discussed 
in this study. The Q2 value obtained from 
the calculation result is 0.509. This value 
is greater than 0 or the value of Q2 > 0, 
indicating that the model has predictive 
relevance. The test results obtained show 
that the effect size value of the effect of 
monopoly power on e-procurement fraud 
is 0.175, where the value is greater than 
0.15 and less than 0.35 so that it falls into 
the strong category. It means that power 
monopoly has an effect on e-procurement 
fraud on structural order. Next, the value 
of the effect size of the effect of integrity 
on e-procurement fraud is 0.678, where the 
value is greater than 0.35, so it falls into 
the strong category. It means that integrity 
has an effect on e-procurement fraud on 
structural order.
Hypothesis Test
Significance testing of the hypothesis is 
used to test whether there is an effect 
of exogenous variable on endogenous 
variable or not. The criteria in testing show 
that if the t-statistic value > t-table (1.96 
sig 5%) and P-value < alpha (0.05), with a 
maximum error rate of 10% or α = 10% and 
t-statistics > 1.64, then it is said that there is 
a significant effect of exogenous variable on 
endogenous variable. The results of testing 
the significance can be found through the 
following table.
The Effect of Monopoly Power on 
e-Procurement Fraud
Based on the test results of the effect of 
monopoly power on e-procurement fraud 
in Table 4.4, it can be seen that the value 
of t-statistics of the effect of monopoly 
power on e-procurement fraud is 4.833 
with p-value of 0,000. The test results show 
that the value of t-statistics > 1.96 and 
p-value < 0.01. This means that there is a 
significant effect of monopoly power on 
e-procurement fraud. Thus, hypothesis 1 is 
supported by research data. The coefficient 
value is 0.218, or positive. This means 
that monopoly power has a positive and 
significant effect on e-procurement fraud.
This can be said that the higher the 
monopoly power, the higher the tendency 
of e-procurement fraud. This result is in 
accordance with the conditions in the 
process of procurement of goods / services 
in the field, where many procurement 
organizations misuse power or authority 
related to their main tasks and functions. 
Monopoly power is not only limited to 
the space owned by the procurator, but 
also used to suppress other procurement 
personnel to comply with the will of the 
owner of the power, for example the Regent 
to the Commitment Making Officer (PPK), 
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the Bid Committee and the Procurement 
Officer to win the preferred partner.
This condition is in accordance with 
the statement in OECD (Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development 
/ OECD, 2010) that in Indonesia, one of the 
factors of procurement fraud is monopoly 
power, that is, accepting bribes in return 
for giving tenders or giving contracts to 
partners they like. This study also supports 
the theory presented by Klitgaard (1988) 
that the monopoly power by government 
officials (Principal) is the important cause 
of fraud, as formulated by Klitgaard: C = 
M + D - A (Corruption equals to Monopoly 
plus Discretion minus Accountability. 
This is in line with the statement that 
many regulations provide public officials 
monopoly authority which may prove 
useful for demanding bribes, especially 
in the procurement of goods / services 
(Soreide, 2002).
The Effect of Integrity on e-Procurement 
Fraud
Based on the test results of the effect of 
integrity on e-procurement fraud in Table 
4.4, it can be seen that the value of t-statistics 
of the effect of integrity on e-procurement 
fraud is 7.257 with p-value of 0.000. The test 
results show that the value of t-statistics > 
1.96 and p-value < 0.01. This means that 
there is a significant effect of integrity on 
e-procurement fraud. Thus, hypothesis 2 is 
supported by research data. The coefficient 
value is -0.2970, or negative. This means 
that integrity has a negative and significant 
effect on e-procurement fraud.
This can be said that the higher the 
integrity, the lower the tendency of 
e-procurement fraud. This result is in 
accordance with Presidential Regulation 
Number 54 of 2010 that to prevent fraud 
in the procurement of goods / services, 
procurement organizations must sign the 
Integrity Pact. This is done for protection 
in the field of law so that procurement 
organizations do not commit fraud due to 
lack of integrity and legal sanctions can be 
enforced according to regulations
It is expected that the high integrity can 
significantly suppress the aspects that cause 
fraud contained in the Fraud Diamond 
theory. With the suppression of these 
aspects, it is expected that e-procurement 
can be reduced and prevented. Related 
to fraud, this study supports the research 
conducted by Huslina (2015) which 
shows that apparatus integrity affects the 
effectiveness of fraud prevention systems 
in the Government.
5. CONCLUSION
Based on the description and the results 
of hypothesis test, it can be concluded 
that monopoly power has a significant 
positive effect on e-procurement fraud, 
while integrity has a significant negative 
effect on e-procurement fraud. This 
proves that the poor implementation of 
e-procurement can lead to a tendency 
to commit fraud. No matter how good 
the information technology system is, 
without being supported by quality 
human resources that are honest and with 
integrity, the system will be in vain. Some 
of the weaknesses of e-procurement occur 
at the stages of planning, determining 
technical requirements, determining the 
specification of goods, giving explanations, 
Table 4
Direct Hypothesis Testing Results
Exogenous Endogenous Original Sample (O)
t-statistics (|O/
STERR|) P-Values
Monopoly Power e-Procurement Fraud 0.218 4.833 0.000***
Integrity
e-Procurement Fraud
-0.297 7.257 0.000***
Note: *** significance level< 0.01
Source: Data Process
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and evaluating bids, where at the stages, 
the procurement officers can still carry out 
a monopoly power accompanied by a lack 
of integrity. The limitation of this study 
is that this research did not involve the 
perspective of the provider (vendor) and 
the recipient of the work result (PPHP) 
because the distribution of questionnaires 
was conducted at the beginning of the 
year where the procurement of goods 
and services had not been carried out. 
Another limitation is that the rate of 
return of the number of questionnaires 
was uneven because there were several 
regional apparatus organizations that had 
not determined who would be appointed 
to carry out the process of procurement 
of goods and services. It is suggested that 
further research add other variables that 
cause fraud in e-procurement and use a 
qualitative approach so that the results 
obtained will be deeper and maximum. 
For the government, it is recommended 
to continue to develop e-procurement 
systems or applications, especially at 
the evaluation stage, making it easier for 
procurement personnel to set quality 
providers. In addition, the quality of 
procurement organizations needs to 
be improved, especially in terms of the 
integrity of procurement people, because 
without good integrity, e-procurement 
cannot run optimally as well as to reduce 
fraud in the procurement of goods and 
services.
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